An analysis of loan default determinants: the Spanish case by Climent Serrano, Salvador & Pavía Miralles, José Manuel
Banks and Bank Systems, Volume 9, Issue 4, 2014 
116
Salvador Climent-Serrano (Spain), Jose M. Pavía (Spain) 
An analysis of loan default determinants: the Spanish case 
Abstract 
The Spanish financial system is experiencing a very turbulent economic period in which loan defaults has lived an 
unprecedented increasing period, going from being less than 1% in 2004 to levels of above 13% in 2013. The impact of 
this, along with other circumstances, has led to the greatest financial restructuring ever made to date in Spain, with 
important macroeconomic and microeconomic consequences. This paper studies the determinants of delinquency (loan 
default) in Spanish credit institutions for the period of 2004-2011 and introduces new variables that have been dis-
closed as relevant in the current financial crisis as well as others non-previously considered internal variables, such as 
hedging derivatives (which are having an increasingly greater importance in accounts of Spanish credit institutions). 
Among the most prominent variables that have had a significant impact on the increase of delinquency are, among 
external variables, house prices, unemployment rates and the number of companies declaring bankruptcy and, among 
internal variables, property investment, customer credits over active, interest rate, participated companies and solvency 
rates. The analysis also shows significant differences in delinquency’s behavior between savings banks and banks and 
between credit institutions that needed recapitalization and those that did not. 
Keywords: default, delinquency, risk management, systemic risk, Spanish financial system. 
JEL Classification: G21, M41.  
Introduction?
The Spanish financial system is facing a very turbu-
lent economic period in which delinquency (loan de-
faults) in Spanish financial institutions has experi-
enced an unprecedented increasing period, going from 
being less than 1% in 2004 to levels of above 13% in 
2013 (Banco de España, 2013). Although Spain fol-
lows the pattern demonstrated in other countries 
(Swedberg, 2013), ensuing the macroeconomic con-
sequences of losses in lending banks and reductions in 
the issuance of new loans, the Spanish financial crisis 
presents some particular characteristics that make it 
singular. Among them, the enormous amount of in-
vestment made by financial institutions in real estate at 
the heat of the housing boom, the lag registered in 
Spain in the bursting of the housing bubble, the high 
leverage of Spanish institutions with foreign investors 
and the deep recession in which Spain seems to have 
fallen, which has considerably damaged its businesses 
and employment. 
The impact of this unprecedented increase of delin-
quency in the Spanish financial institutions, along with 
other circumstances, has led to the greatest financial 
restructuring ever made to date in Spain. Through an 
intense process of fusions and absorptions, the sector 
has experienced a really significant reduction in the 
number of its institutions, mainly focused on savings 
banks (Climent, 2012) ? which have passed from 45 
to 10 changing as well their corporate structure to 
become commercial banks. This process has practi-
cally resulted in the disappearance of traditional sav-
ings banks, which had previously formed part of the 
Spanish financial system for almost 200 years and 
represented a 45% share of the financial market. Fur-
ther, in line with other developed countries (Weber 
and Schmitz, 2011; Rose and Wieladek, 2012), the 
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Spanish credit institutions have received direct public 
funding to guarantee their sustainability. Funds that in 
the case of Spain have exceeded 6% of the Spanish 
GDP (FROB, 2013).
In light of the events to which have contributed in part 
delinquency, it is paramount that further analyses of 
the impact of default on Spanish credit institutions is 
carried out and also to further study its determinants in 
order to construct an econometric model from which 
explain aggregate default levels in the Spanish finan-
cial companies. From the perspective of banks, a 
proper management of risks requires the ability to 
monitor these numbers and, from a policy perspective, 
it is an important to quantify these risks in order to 
know the likelihood of new additional recapitaliza-
tions and when the issuance of new loans is going to 
recover. Indeed, one area that has received relatively 
little attention is the interrelation between risk, risk 
management and management accounting and control 
practices, some issues that likely should be reformu-
lated (reconstructed) after the financial crisis (Huber 
and Scheytt, 2013) and will lead to more risk-related 
disclosures (Oliveira et al., 2013). 
The rest of the document is structured as follows. Sec-
tion 1 offers a background of the issue. Section 2 pre-
sents methodology and details objectives. Section 3 
shows results. And, final section states the main con-
clusions. 
1. Background 
The analysis of the impact of loan default on the Span-
ish financial system and the study of its determinants 
is not new and has already been the object of interest 
in other periods. Fernandez de Lis et al. (2000) ana-
lyzed the determinants of delinquency in the period of 
1963-1999 and pointed to economic cycle and compe-
tency increase as the most significant determinants. 
Freixas et al. (1994) focused on the period of 1973-
1992 using variables such as economic growth, infla-
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tion, expectations of economic activity and interest 
rate. Delgado and Saurina (2004) examined during the 
period 1982-2001 the relationship between the most 
relevant macroeconomic variables (such as GDP 
variation, interest rates, level of debt, financial burden 
and asset prices) and the risk of credit in banks and 
savings banks. Furthermore, Saurina (1998) tries to 
explain delinquency from 1985 to 1995 using both 
internal and external variables. Salas and Saurina 
(2002) use a wide range of internal and external vari-
ables to obtain the determinants of risky loans between 
1985 and 1997, distinguishing between savings banks 
and banks. And, more recently, Gonzalez and Diez 
(2010) relate credit growth, delinquency and eco-
nomic cycle to deduce that credit grows and delin-
quency decreases in expansive cycles whilst the oppo-
site occurs during recessions. Foos et al. (2010), in a 
study involving 16 European countries including 
Spain, note that credit growth entails an increase in 
loss provisions during the three years following. De 
los Rios et al. (2012) study the difference between 
savings banks and banks with respect to risk manage-
ment and social responsibility. And, Jiménez et al. 
(2013) find a negative relationship between loan 
market power and bank risk during the period of 
1988-2003. 
Regarding studies on other countries different from 
other than Spain, one can cite the papers published by 
Crook and Banasik (2012), Magri and Pico (2012), 
Esteban and Estrada (2013), and Ramcharan and 
Crowe (2013), among the latest researches. Crook and 
Banasik (2012) relate delinquency rate to debt levels, 
interest rates and house prices in the USA during the 
period between 1987 and 2009. Magri and Pico (2012) 
relate interest and delinquency rates in the Italian fi-
nancial institutions in the period of 2000-2007. 
Esteban and Estrada (2013) found house prices, out-
standing mortgage debts and, to a lesser extent, in-
come levels to be the principal determinants of delin-
quency in the Columbian financial institutions from 
1997 to 2004; while Ramcharan and Crowe (2013) 
show that house price fluctuations have a significant 
impact on credit markets well beyond the mortgage 
segment, being thus a potentially catalyst for macroe-
conomic shocks. In this line, Vallascas and Keasey 
(2012) identify which bank characteristics offer a 
shelter from systemic shocks and demonstrate some 
key determinants of a bank’s risk exposure. 
There also exists a literature on the subprime mort-
gages in the USA, among which Demyanyk and Van 
Hemert (2011), Brent et al. (2011), Roll (2001), Sar-
miento (2012) and Dell’Ariccia et al. (2012) can be 
cited. Demyanyk and Van Hemert (2011) maintain 
that the high rate of growth in house prices masked the 
delinquency of subprime mortgages between 2003 and 
2005. Brent et al. (2011) find that the mortgagee’s 
income and the economic cycle were determinants of 
delinquency in the period from 2004 to 2009. Sar-
miento (2012) shows unemployment increases playing 
a very significant role in mortgage defaults rise during 
the Great Recession. Roll (2011) proposes a com-
pletely alternative tale and disagrees about the most 
popular explanations of the financial crisis, advocating 
for a different US macroeconomic policy. And 
Dell’Ariccia et al. (2012) conclude that during the 
periods of rapid credit growth lending conditions were 
relaxed, with the relaxation increasing when competi-
tion and also house prices rise. A summary of the 
variables used as determinant of delinquency in all the 
above mentioned papers is shown in Table 1. 
This paper adds to the delinquency literature a couple 
of new features that we think could be of interest. 
Firstly, it is centred on a long and homogenous period 
in Spain that up until now had not been studied; a 
period in which the delinquency in Spain went from 
historic minimums to historic maximums with a trend 
of continuous growth. Secondly, regarding the vari-
ables used, the study includes both new internal and 
external variables. In particular, in addition to the de-
terminants highlighted in the overview of the delin-
quency literature, this study incorporates new account 
variables, such as hedging derivatives, the portfolio of 
participated companies and property investments 
(within the internal variables) and the increase in the 
number of companies in bankruptcy (within the exter-
nal variables), that apparently have not been consid-
ered until now. 
Table 1. Variables used as determinants of delinquency in previous researches 
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Efficiency   X   X                     
Delinquency with delay   X   X X X                   X 
Portfolio composition   X   X                     
Interest, margin X X   X X       X X       X   X 
Solvency       X                     X   
Branch expansion   X   X   X                   X 
Real estate assets   X     X                   
Inflation X                           X   
E
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es
  
House prices                 X X X   X   
Stock exchange X                           
Salaries X                           
GDP X X X X X X   X         X   X  X 
Money supply X                           
Unemployment                X  
Expectations X                           
Debt X X   X X       X X         
Savings banks and banks       X X             X     
Source: own elaboration. 
2. Objectives and methodology 
2.1. Objectives. The objective of this research is to 
construct an econometric model from which to explain 
the level of delinquency, using as indicators all the 
relevant variables that may have an impact on delin-
quency and on its effects. These determinants will 
include both microeconomic (e.g., house prices) and 
macroeconomic external factors (e.g., unemployment 
rates) as well as internal factors of the credit institu-
tions (e.g., property assets or leverage of the institu-
tion). As such, this will create a tool that can help to 
manage the effect of certain decisions with respect to 
the control of delinquency. Likewise, the model will 
permit the projection of the impact on delinquency of 
some of the external variables ? for example, two of 
them, house prices and the unemployment level, are 
included in the model with lags of order one and two, 
respectively. 
In addition, and given the different impact the eco-
nomic and financial events have had on banks and 
saving banks (see, Climent-Serrano and Pavía, 2014) a 
separate analysis has been carried out on each of the 
groups in order to analyze the possible differences. In 
this way, we can study whether the type of corporate 
governance has a differential impact on the develop-
ment of delinquency, since as Park (2012, p. 907) 
points out “corruption significantly aggravates the 
problems with bad loans in the banking sector”. The 
analysis will also be extended to study (through two 
new regressions) the differences between institutions 
that have received aid and those that have not. The 
constructed models therefore could be used to im-
prove our information levels and our knowledge about 
the mechanism that operate in this issue, making it 
easier to predict future trends in delinquency and con-
sequently enabling the necessary preventative meas-
ures to be taken for banks, their shareholders, the su-
pervisor and stakeholders in general. 
2.2. Methodology. To perform the analysis, unbal-
anced panel data regression techniques are used com-
bining macroeconomic variables with information 
from the latest financial annual accounts reports of the 
period of 2004-2011 of all the Spanish savings banks 
and the 13 largest commercial banks, which together 
make up 99% of the assets of Spanish banks and sav-
ings banks. The total number of institutions in 2004 
was 58, while there were 20 in 2011. This difference is 
the result of the restructuring process (which is still 
ongoing) of the mergers and absorptions that occurred 
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in the course of 8 years and especially in 2010 (Cli-
ment Serrano, 2013). 
Financial institutions annual accounts reports are 
drawn up and approved by the board of directors of 
each entity and by their general meetings or share-
holders’ meetings, undergo internal audit controls and 
are audited by independent companies overseen by the 
Bank of Spain. However, despite all these controls, 
these measures are not always sufficient to ensure that 
the accounts reflect fairly the assets of the institutions, 
as has occurred in those credit institutions that had to 
be intervened, characterized by pre-crisis weaker cor-
porative governances, where the new administrators 
have reformulated the accounts having come to light 
significant losses in all cases (see, e.g., Climent-
Serrano and Pavía, 2015a). Therefore, the accounts 
used have been the new reformulated accounts, which 
show a high level of losses. 
Using this information, an econometric model is con-
structed based on an unbalanced panel data with 400 
observations in which dependent variable is loan de-
fault, measured as a ratio between non-performing 
loans and the total amount of loans. As explicative 
variables, in addition to the ones already studied in the 
previous literature, four new features have been also 
considered: property investments, participated compa-
nies, hedging derivatives and, number of companies in 
(bankruptcy or) administration. Below (in subsection 
2.3) the independent variables of the model are listed. 
The availability of information for a sample of be-
tween 58 and 20 institutions (depending on the year) 
and 8 time periods, allows the use of a double tempor-
al and cross-section dimension of the sample through 
an econometric model of non-balanced panel data. 
This provides us, compared to just cross-sectional 
databases, with a more informative database (with 
more variability, less collinearity and more degrees of 
freedom) that will permit us to attain more efficient 
estimates in an econometric linear regression model 
and mainly to control for endogeneity and/or individ-
ual unobserved heterogeneity (Arellano and Bon-
home, 2012). Therefore, along with the components 
that could determine delinquency, it is acknowledged 
that each institution may have specific characteristics, 
?j = ? + vj, albeit non-measurable and non-
observable, which can affect the relationship. Hence 
the model ultimately specified has been: 
1 1
.? ?
I E
ji j i jt i t jt
i= i=
Delinquency =? + ? int.var + ? ext.var +?
?i being the coefficient of ith the internal variable in the 
regression model, ?e the coefficient of the eth external 
variable, subindex j denotes entity, t represents time, I
is the number of internal variables, E is the number of 
external variables and ?jt is a disturbance error term. 
According to the goals stated in subsection 2.1, five 
different variants of this model have been considered. 
The first model, the baseline model, is made up of all 
the institutions and all the time periods available, in 
total, 71 entities and 400 observations. The second and 
third models are made by dividing the complete sam-
ple into two sub-samples, savings banks and banks, 
with the objective of studying the possible differences 
between them. In models four and five, the sample is 
sub-divided into those entities that received help and 
those that did not. 
2.3. Variables. The list of account features handled 
has been, as internal variables, investment properties
(ratio of investment in properties and assets), leverage
(ratio of customer deposits on loans) increased appro-
priations set (loan increasing less nominal GDP in-
creasing), hedging derivatives (ratio of hedging deriv-
atives over assets), real estate assets (ratio of secured 
loans to total loans), ratio client credit-active (ratio of 
customer loans over assets), interest rate (interest rate 
of the asset), participated companies (ratio of inves-
tees on participated companies over assets), solvency
(equity ratio of the group over assets) and, as external 
variables, bankruptcy (annual variation in the number 
of companies in bankruptcy), unemployment rate (-2)
(unemployment rate of the Spanish economy with a 
delay of two years) and house prices (-1) (annual 
change in the average price of housing in Spain, ac-
cording to the Ministry of Industry, with a lag of a 
year). House price lag has been set in one to include 
information delays and owners’ psychological elastic-
ity and unemployment rates are included with a lag of 
order two to account for the unemployment regulation 
benefits prevailing in Spain during the study period. 
3. Results 
The econometric software Eviews in its version 7 has 
been used to estimate with pooled data, fixed effects 
and random effects the models specified in the pre-
vious section. Homogeneity tests indicate that fixed 
effects models are preferable to pooled data models 
while Hausman tests point to the fixed effects specifi-
cation as preferable to the random effects one. Hence, 
the fixed effects model will be the one presented in 
this research. 
Table 2 shows the results obtained in the regressions. 
There are no problems with co-linearity or correlation 
problems among the predictors employed and as the 
Durbin-Watson test shows (see the bottom of Table 2) 
there are no remarkable concerns of residual autocor-
relation. Likewise, the R2 results obtained indicate that 
the regressions explain a large percentage of delin-
quencies in all models used. This latter result may lead 
to the idea that there is a problem of over-
parameterization affecting the model specifications. In 
order to dispel this doubt and following the philosophy 
of machine learning (Bishop, 2006), the sample was 
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randomly divided into two groups, one of modeliza-
tion (learning group) with 80% of the observations 
and the other of evaluation (test group) with the re-
maining 20%. The test results showed an excellent 
predictive capability of the model, consistent with the 
observed R2.
Although as a rule a similar core group of variables 
are identified as significant in the plurality of the 
modls, with the one with the greatest difference being 
the unaided entities’ model, large differences between 
groups could be observed with respect to the impact of 
the determinants. Focusing first on the baseline model, 
we find that the variables that have been revealed as 
significant with a positive sign, and therefore contrib-
uting to the increase in delinquency, are property in-
vestment and interest rate, among the internal vari-
ables, and unemployment rates and number of compa-
nies declaring bankruptcy, among the external vari-
ables. On the other hand, with a negative impact, 
meaning their increase leads to a reduction in delin-
quency, we can find participated companies, solvency 
and the ratio of customer credit over active, as internal 
variables, and house prices, as external variable. 
Table 2. Coefficients estimates of delinquency determinants 
Variables
Baseline 
model
Savings banks Banks Differences 
Aided
entities 
Unaided 
entities 
Differences 
Constant 
0.078*** 0.085*** 0.043* 0.041* 0.045*** 0.008 0.037 
(0.013) (0.016) (0.024)  (0.016) (0.024)  
Property 
investment 
0.434*** 0.419*** 0.427** -0.008* 0.544*** 0.148 0.396** 
(0.084) (0.099) (0.197)  (0.099) (0.139)  
Leverage 
-0.007 -0.008 -0.011 0.003 0.003 -0.017 0.019** 
(0.007) (0.010) (0.009)  (0.008) (0.011)  
Credit increase 
0.001 -0.033** 0.001 -0.034** 0.018 -0.002 0.020* 
(0.006) (0.015) (0.005)  (0.012) (0.005)  
Hedging
derivatives 
-0.115 -0.230 0.160 -0.390 0.251 -0.072 0.324 
(0.186) (0.0227) (0.331)  (0.224) (0.261)  
Real estate 
assets 
0.008 0.007 0.021** -0.014* -0.002 0.012* -0.015* 
(0.005) (0.006) (0.008)  (0.006) (0.006)  
Customer credit 
over active 
-0.054*** -0.075*** -0.011 -0.063** -0.044** 0.044 -0.087** 
(0.018) (0.024) (0.027)  (0.020) (0.037)  
Interest rates 
0.373*** 0.492*** -0.117 0.608*** 0.548*** -0.168 0.716*** 
(0.10) (0.0147) (0.199)  (0.140) (0.198)  
Participated 
companies 
-0.204*** -0.198 -0.072 -0.126 -0.335** 0.041 -0.376** 
(0.067) (0.142) (0.117)  (0.139) (0.104)  
Solvency 
-0.603*** -0.658*** -0.128 -0.530*** -0.737*** -0.172 -0.565*** 
(0.011) (0.078) (0.149)  (0.083) (0.106)  
House prices 
(-1) 
-0.204*** -0.172*** -0.195*** 0.023 -0.255*** -0.162*** -0.093*** 
(0.011) (0.020) (0.016)  (0.021) (0.014)  
Unemployment 
rate (-2) 
0.235*** 0.339*** 0.079* 0.259*** 0.441*** 0.153*** 0.288*** 
(0.033) (0.044) (0.045)  (0.017) (0.040)  
Bankruptcy 
0.017*** 0.015*** 0.012** 0.003 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.000 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.005)  (0.003) (0.004)  
R2 = 0.936 
D-W = 1.74 
n = 400 
R2 = 0.945 
D-W = 1.73 
n = 313 
R2 = 0.839 
D-W = 1.77 
n = 87 
R2 = 0.957 
D-W = 1.81 
n = 280 
R2 = 0.770 
D-W = 2.30 
n = 120 
Source: Own elaboration. Calculations made using EViews, Release 7. Dependent variable: delinquency, Standard deviations in 
brackets. *, **, and *** denote significance at level 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. D-W: Durbin-Watson statistics. 
The rest of the variables did not prove to be signifi-
cant. Leverage, which had a negative coefficient, and 
credit increase, with a coefficient practically zero, 
cannot be considered as important determinants in 
delinquency. It also highlights that the hedging deriva-
tives variable, which aims to reduce the risk, does not 
appear to be significant, in this case nevertheless the-
coefficient is negative, so keeping this sign would 
reduce delinquency. This meaningfulness of hedging 
could occur, according to Engel (2013), for the use of 
derivatives not only to hedge but also for speculative 
purposes.
Analyzing the two models that serve to distinguish 
between savings banks and banks, we see that the 
variable participated companies lost its significance in 
savings banks while the variable credit increase be-
comes significant with a negative coefficient. This last 
result tells us that the increase in credit, more so than 
nominal GDP increase, contributed to the moderation 
of the increase of delinquency in the savings banks. 
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Comparing the model of the banks to the baseline 
model we observe that a large number of internal 
variables become not significant, in particular the four 
variables: ratio of credit over active, participated com-
panies, solvency and interest rate. The result for this 
last variable is really interesting given that it is no 
longer significant and its coefficient changes from 
positive to negative, telling us that the impact of an 
increase in the interest rate did not contribute to delin-
quency in banks, when in the case of savings banks, 
this variable is not only significant but it shows a coef-
ficient greater than in the baseline model. Also re-
markable is the behavior of the variable real estate 
assets, which after being not significant in the baseline 
model, becomes significant in the case of banks’ 
model. 
Comparing the estimated coefficients between both 
models, significant differences could be observed 
between savings banks’ and banks’ models. In particu-
lar, and in addition to the differences in the impact of 
interest rate already pointed out, it highlights the dif-
ference between the coefficients of the unemployment 
level, 0.339 for savings banks and 0.079 for banks. 
that in a situation as the one in the current labor mar-
ket, with levels of unemployment above 20%, sug-
gests that the impact on savings banks is greater than 
on banks, without doubt a consequence of their differ-
ent loan portfolio composition, which indeed is a re-
flection of the different risk credit policies they fol-
lowed during the housing boom and their different 
target populations. In general, these differences in the 
regression coefficients, both internal and external, 
along with the different structure of the distributions in 
internal determinants between banks and savings 
banks explains why the average level of delinquency 
during the whole period in the banks is 0.66% less 
than in the savings banks. 
Analyzing the model of the institutions that have re-
ceived aid, we observe the same significant variables 
as in the baseline model, whilst the model for non-
aided institutions shows hardly any significant internal 
variables, with only real estate assets being significant. 
The significance of all the external variables, however, 
is maintained in both models. 
Comparing the coefficients for these two models, one 
can see that among the internal variables there are 
significant differences in interest rates, participated 
companies and solvency and, to a lesser extent, in 
leverage, credit increase, real estate assets and client 
credit over active. Indeed, almost all the coefficients of 
the interval variables are significantly different in the 
two models. Furthermore, among the external vari-
ables, it highlights the significant differences in house 
prices and unemployment rates that in addition are 
significant in both models, something that hardly hap-
pens with internal variables. The impact of the reduc-
tion in house prices and the increase in unemployment 
rates is greater in those institutions that received help 
than in those that did not need help. 
As in the models of banks and savings banks, these 
differences in the regression coefficients, both internal 
and external, along with the different structure of the 
distributions of the variables studied, explain why the 
average rate of delinquency has been 1.17% higher 
during the whole period in the institutions receiving 
help than in the unaided institutions. 
Conclusions
The current socio-economic environment has contrib-
uted significantly to increase delinquency in Spanish 
credit institutions. In fact, according to the results of 
the regressions, the evolution of external variables in 
recent years has significantly impacted on the levels of 
delinquency. Both decrease in house prices and in-
crease in unemployment jointly with the number of 
companies undergoing bankruptcy have contributed to 
rising loan defaults. This impact was also seen to be 
higher in savings banks than in banks and in those 
institutions that received aid rather than those that did 
not, without doubt as a consequence of their different 
target populations and risky policies, more soft-
information based (Parnes, 2012), which are reflected 
in the composition of their loan portfolios. 
As far as internal variables concerns, an increase in 
property investment and an increase in interest rate 
have been seen to contribute to an increase in delin-
quency whilst increases in the ratio of customer loans 
to assets, participated companies and solvency help to 
reduce delinquency. 
The variables leverage, credit increase, real estate 
assets and hedging derivatives have proved to be in-
significant. It is noticeable that variables such as lev-
erage or credit increase have hardly had any repercus-
sion on delinquency, being unimportant and with very 
small coefficients. Equally, it was initially surprising 
that expected results were not achieved for the hedg-
ing derivatives, as its impact is not significant, al-
though its coefficient does appear with an expected 
negative sign. The impact of some of the variables has 
been very different between savings banks and banks, 
especially in relation to interest rate and unemploy-
ment level which helps to explain the difference of 
0.66% on average in delinquency rates throughout the 
period. 
In this sense, the results of this study add to those of 
other studies that also found differences between 
banks and savings banks in different periods and in 
different ways, such as Coello (1994), Pastor (1994), 
Azofra and Santamaria (2004), Fonseca et al. (2011), 
Climent (2012) and Climent and Pavía (2015b). 
Finally, significant differences are also found between 
institutions that received aid and those that did not, the 
main differences being in the variables property in-
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vestment, interest rate, participated companies, sol-
vency, house prices and unemployment rates. This 
situation has resulted in the average delinquency 
level being 1.17% higher in aided institutions, which 
eventually led them being faced with massive recapi-
talization that accounted for 6% of the Spanish GDP. 
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